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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Patrick Suttle pied guilty to one count of 
attempted strangulation and one count of misdemeanor battery. On appeal, he 
contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. 
Mr. Suttle was prosecuted for attempted strangulation and misdemeanor battery 
based on the same course of conduct. The multiple offenses arose out of the same, 
indivisible course of criminal conduct, that is, the attempted strangulation charge was 
merely a means or manner by which the battery charge occurred. Due to these 
violations of his state and federal constitutional protections against double jeopardy, this 
Court should overturn the district court's order denying his motion to correct an illegal 
sentence and vacate Mr. Suttle's conviction for attempted strangulation. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
On May 10, 2009, Mr. Suttle and his ex-girlfriend, Michelle Ahmuty, got into an 
argument. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSl),1 p.2.) The argument 
became physical and, during the argument, Mr. Suttle allegedly struck Ms. Ahmuty 
about the face and in the head, burned Ms. Ahmuty's arm with a cigarette, and placed 
his hands around her neck. (PSI, p.2.) Also, during the argument, Mr. Suttle allegedly 
threatened Ms. Ahmuty, saying that he would have his friends harm her if she contacted 
the police, and allegedly took her cell phone and prevented her from leaving the house. 
(PSI, p.2.) Based on these allegations, Mr. Suttle was charged by Information with one 
count of felony attempted strangulation, one count of intimidating a witness, one count 
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of misdemeanor false imprisonment, two counts of misdemeanor battery, and one count 
of petit theft. (R.40689, pp.33-35.) 
Pursuant 
attempted 
plea agreement, 
and one count 
Suttle pied to one count of 
misdemeanor battery, and the remaining 
counts were dismissed. (R.40689, pp.37-40.) Mr. Suttle was sentenced to a unified 
sentence of ten years, with three years fixed and 180 days in jail, but the district court 
suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Suttle on probation for 10 years. (R.40689, 
pp.64-66.) After Mr. Suttle admitted to violating the terms and conditions of his 
probation in 2011, was reinstated on probation. (R.40689, pp.72-75, 78-81, 97-102.) 
After he was found for a second time to have violated the terms and conditions of his 
probation, the district court revoked his probation. (R.40689, pp.144-147, 151-153; 
12/20/12Tr., p.117, Ls.2-5; 1/17/13 , p.1 Ls.6-7.) 
Mr. Suttle timely appealed from the order revoking his probation. (R.40689, 
pp.154-156.) The Idaho Court of Appeals issued an opinion on December 31, 2013, 
which affirmed the district court's decision. (R.42247, p.32.) A remittitur was issued on 
January 24, 2014. (R.42247, p.32.) 
Mr. Suttle subsequently filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35. (R.42247, pp.27-30.) That motion was denied without a 
hearing on May 21, 2014. (R.42247, pp.31-35.) The district court first noted that it was 
limited to reviewing the face of the record pursuant to State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82 
(2009). (R.42247, p.33.) The district court recognized this Court's decision in State v. 
Moffat, 154 Idaho 523 (2013), but found that it applied only when a defendant was 
1 The designation "PSI" includes the PSI and all attachments contained in the electronic 
file, including Addendums to the PSI, police reports, the mental health evaluation and 
letters from family and friends in support of Mr. Suttle. 
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consecutively prosecuted, and Mr. Suttle was prosecuted simuitaneously, thus Moffat 
was distinguishable. (R.42247, pp.33-34.) The court reiterated that it could not revisit 
the facts underlying the offense through a motion to correct an illegal sentence. 
(R.42247, pp.33-35.) 
On June 23, 2014, Mr. Suttle filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the Order 
Denying Rule 35 Motion. (R.42247, pp.45-48, 58-61.) On August 7, 2014, this Court 
took judicial notice of the Clerk's Record, Reporter's Transcript and Exhibits in State v. 
Suttle, Supreme Court No. 40689. R.42247, p.2.) Mr. Suttle contends on appeal that 
the district court erred in denying his Rule 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence 
where he was charged with, and pied guilty, to two acts constituting one offense, in 
contravention of his constitutional right to be free from Double Jeopardy. 
3 
!SSUE 
Whether Mr. Suttle's convictions and sentences for attempted strangulation and 
misdemeanor battery are illegal because they violate constitutional prohibitions against 
double jeopardy? 
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ARGUMENT 
Mr. Suttle's Convictions And Sentences For Attempted Strangulation And Misdemeanor 
Batte y Are Illegal Because They Violate Constitutional Prohibitions Against Double 
Jeopardy 
A. Introduction 
The protections against double jeopardy in the United States and Idaho 
Constitutions extend to prevent multiple punishments for the same criminal conduct 
Those protections cannot be circumvented simply by breaking a single course of 
criminal conduct into multiple acts so as to charge multiple crimes. Unless the actions 
are occurring in different places, at different times, or to different people, the course of 
conduct is indivisible and pursuing punishments for multiple acts occurring during an 
indivisible course of conduct is prohibited by the state and federal constitutions. 
Mr. Suttle's convictions constitute multiple punishments for the same indivisible course 
of criminal conduct, thus his convictions violated his rights against Double Jeopardy 
under the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. 
8. A Double Jeopardy Claim May Be Raised Through A Rule 35 Motion To Correct 
An Illegal Sentence 
Mr. Suttle properly moved the district court, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 
35(a), to correct his sentence where it is illegal as it violates his right to be free from 
double jeopardy. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) permits a district court to correct an illegal sentence at 
any time. State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 84 (2009). "[T]he term 'illegal sentence' 
under I.C.R. 35 is narrowly interpreted as a sentence that is illegal from the face of the 
record, i.e., does not involve significant questions of fact or require an evidentiary 
hearing." Id. at 86 (holding that reviewing a preliminary hearing transcript to determine 
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whether the two offenses arose out of the same indivisible course of conduct constituted 
significant fact-finding). Generally, whether a sentence is illegal or was imposed in an 
illegal fashion is a question of law, over which an appellate court exercises free 
review. Id. at 84. 
A double jeopardy claim may be raised in a Rule 35 motion. State v. McKinney, 
153 Idaho 837, 841 (2013) (holding that a double jeopardy claim may be brought in a 
Rule 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence); State v. Moad, 156 Idaho 654, 657 
(Ct. App. 2014) (holding that whether the double jeopardy bar precludes multiple 
punishments for convictions obtained in a single case could be raised in a post-verdict 
motion, at sentencing, or in a Rule 35 motion); State v. Jensen, 138 Idaho 941, 944, n.2 
(Ct. App. 2003) (holding that defendant's double jeopardy claim was untimely in an 
appeal from an order revoking probation, but noting that the defendant could present 
the issue of double jeopardy by a motion under Rule 35 to correct an illegal sentence or 
by an application for post-conviction relief). 
C. Mr. Suttle's Convictions And Sentences For Attempted Strangulation And 
Misdemeanor Battery Are Illegal Because They Violate Constitutional 
Prohibitions Against Double Jeopardy 
Mr. Suttle was prosecuted and convicted of attempted strangulation and 
misdemeanor battery in violation of his due process rights under the United States 
Constitution and the Idaho Constitution. 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states "nor shall any 
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[.]"2 
This "Double Jeopardy Clause 'protects against a second prosecution for the same 
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offense after acquittal, it protects against a second prosecution for the same offense 
after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense."' 
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977) (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 
711, 717 (1969)). In relevant part, Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution 
provides that "[n]o person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense[.]" 
In interpreting the Fifth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has held 
that where a lesser offense requires no proof beyond that required for conviction of the 
greater offense, the offenses are "the same offense" within the meaning of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause and, cannot be twice prosecuted and twice punished. Brown, 432 
U.S. at 168-69; see State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 433 (1980) (''The prohibition 
against double jeopardy has been held to mean that defendant may not be convicted of 
both a greater and lesser included offense."). 
"There are two theories under which a particular offense may be determined to 
be a lesser included offense." State v. Curtis, 130 Idaho 522, 524 (1996). Under the 
"statutory theory" an offense is a lesser-included offense of the greater offense if it is 
impossible to commit the greater offense without also committing the lesser offense in 
the process. Id. In contrast, under the "pleading theory" an offense is a lesser-included 
offense "if it is alleged in the information as a means or element of the commission of 
the higher offense." Id. 
2 The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment is applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Brown v. Ohio, 
432 U.S. 161, 164 (1977). 
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1. Mr. Suttle's Prosecutions And Convictions Are Violative Of Due Process 
Under The 8/ockburger Statutory Test 
Mr. Suttle's dual prosecution and punishment for attempted strangulation and 
misdemeanor battery placed him in double jeopardy in violation of his federal 
constitutional rights because the misdemeanor battery is an included offense of 
attempted strangulation. 
The United States Supreme Court applies a statutory theory to determine 
whether a defendant's prosecution or conviction and punishment violates the Double 
Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution. See Blockburger v. United States, 
285 U.S. 299 (1932). 
The test under Blockburger provides that, where the same act or transaction 
constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to 
determine whether there have been two offenses or only one for double jeopardy 
purposes is whether each statutory provision requires proof of an additional fact which 
the other does not. Id. at 304. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the Blockburger 
test is appropriate to determine whether an offense is a lesser included offense under 
the statutory theory in analyzing if there has been a double jeopardy violation under the 
United States Constitution. State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 527 (2011 ). 
Under the Blockburger test, the question is whether each statutory provision 
requires proof of a fact [element] not required by the other statute. Blockburger, 284 
U.S. at 180. The United States Supreme Court has clarified that, "[i]t has long been 
understood that separate statutory crimes need not be identical either in constituent 
elements or in actual proof in order to be the same within the meaning of the 
constitutional prohibition." Brown, 432 U.S. at 164. 
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The two statutes at issue in this case are I.C. § 18-923 (attempted strangulation) 
and I.C. § ·18-903 (misdemeanor battery). (R.40689, pp.30-31.) The elements for 
attempted strangulation are that the defendant (1) willfully and unlawfully (2) choked or 
attempted to strangle (3) a household member. I.C. § 18-923(1 ); see also I.C.J.I. 1214. 
The elements for misdemeanor battery are that the defendant (1) willfully and unlawfully 
... (2)(c) caused bodily harm to the victim. LC. § 18-903; see also I.C.J.I. 1204. Both 
statutes require willful and unlawful action. The other element required in either statute 
is that the defendant touches the victim. 
In this case, misdemeanor battery and attempted strangulation are included 
offenses to one another under the Blockburger test. Both of the statutes in question 
require proof of unlawful and intentional touching. The only difference is the specificity 
required to prove that fact: touching causing bodily harm, as opposed to touching with 
the intent to choke or strangle. However, as the Brown Court pointed out, such 
variation in required proof does not void the constitutional protection. Brown, 432 U.S. 
at 164. Both statutes require proof of the fact that the defendant intentionally touched 
the victim in unlawful manner. Since both statutes require proof of the same elements, 
there is no bilateral uniqueness. Bilateral uniqueness requires the conclusion that not 
all attempted strangulations are batteries and not all batteries are attempted 
strangulations. Therefore, charges under the two statutes may not be separately 
prosecuted because they are included charges. 
As Mr. Suttle was charged with and pied guilty to both misdemeanor battery and 
attempted strangulation, the punishment for both offenses violated his constitutional 
rights to be free from double jeopardy. As such, the district court's denial of his motion 
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to correct an illegal sentence was improper. This Court should overturn that decision 
and vacate the attempted strangulation conviction. 
2. Mr. Suttle's Prosecutions And Convictions Are Violative Of Due Process 
Under The Thompson Pleading Test 
Should this Court determine that these charges constitute separate offenses 
under the Blockburger test, it must still analyze the claim under the Idaho Constitution, 
which is assessed using the Thompson "pleadings" test. State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 
368, 374, 256 P.3d 776, 782 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 
434 (1980)); see Flegel, 151 Idaho at 229. That test examines the charging documents 
to determine whether, where there is one event of criminal conduct, one charge is 
merely the means or element of the commission of the other. Thompson, 101 Idaho at 
434. 
In analyzing whether there has been a double jeopardy violation under the Idaho 
Constitution, the Idaho Supreme Court recently used the Thompson pleading theory. 
McKinney, 153 Idaho at 841. In Idaho, whether a defendant's prosecution or 
punishment complies with constitutional protection against double jeopardy is a 
question of law over which appellate courts exercise free review. State v. Moffat, 154 
Idaho 529, 530 (Ct. App. 2013). Since Idaho has adopted the broader "pleading 
theory," Thompson, 101 Idaho at 433-34, "an 'included offense' is one which is 
necessarily committed in the commission of another offense; or one, the essential 
elements of which are charged in the information as the manner or means by which the 
offense was committed." Id. at 434 (quoting State v. Hall, 86 Idaho 63, 69 (1963)). 
Mr. Suttle was charged by information with one count of felony attempted 
strangulation, one count of intimidating a witness, one count of misdemeanor false 
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imprisonment, two counts of misdemeanor battery, and one count of petit theft, all 
arising from a single altercation between he and Ms. Ahmuty. (R.40689, pp.33-35.) 
The poiice report stated: 
Suttle pushed Michelle onto the couch and began punching her in the face 
and back of the head. Michelle could not recall how many times Suttle 
had punched her. He held her down and ripped her t shirt off. Suttle 
strangled her with his hands as he held her down on the couch. 
(PSI, p.95.) 
The charging document in this case reveals that the State is not charging 
separate events of criminal conduct: 
COUNT I 
That the Defendant, PATRICK E. SUTTLE, on or about the ·10 th day of 
March, 2009, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did willfully and 
unlawfully choke or attempt to strangle the person of Michelle Ahmuty, to-
wit: by placing his hands around Michelle Ahmuty's neck and squeezing, 
and where Michelle Ahmuty and the Defendant are household members 
or have had a dating relationship. 
COUNT IV 
That the Defendant, PATRICK E. SUTTLE, on or about the 10th day of 
March, 2009, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did unlawfully and 
intentionally cause bodily harm, to-wit: by causing bruising on Michelle 
Ahmuty's arms, face, and contusions to Michelle Ahmuty's head. 
(R.40689, pp.10-11.) It is clear from the face of the charging document that the two 
charges address the same conduct and that Count I is merely an element of Count IV or 
the means by which Count IV was committed. The problem is specifically evidenced by 
the reference to injury to the arms, face and head. Therefore, they charge the same 
conduct in violation of the pleadings test. 
Thus, under either the United States or Idaho Constitutions, the dual 
prosecutions and convictions were inappropriate, and the subsequent punishments 
entered on those two counts violated Mr. Suttle's right to be free from double jeopardy. 
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3. En a in In The Simultaneous Prosecution Or Alternative! Im osin 
Punishment For Both Attempted Strangulation And Misdemeanor Battery, 
Violated Mr. Suttle's Constitutional Ri ht To Be Free From Double 
Jeopardy 
Mr. Suttle asserts that the actions he pied guilty to which occurred on May 10, 
2009 (the attempted strangulation and the misdemeanor battery) constitute one, 
indivisible course of conduct, since they were not spatially or temporally separated and 
were performed in response to a single criminal impulse. As such, he contends that 
those actions cannot be artificially separated into multiple counts, as the State did in this 
case, without violating his constitutional rights to be free from double jeopardy. 
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth Amendment's Double 
Jeopardy Clause to mean that "two valid sentences for the same conviction cannot 
coexist." Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 267 (1943). Article I, Section 13 of 
the Idaho Constitution is coextensive with the federal provision. State v. McKeeth, 136 
Idaho 619, 624 (Ct. App. 2001 ). These protections can be violated in three ways: 
(1) engaging in a second prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal has been 
entered; (2) engaging in a second prosecution for the same offense after a conviction 
has been entered; or (3) imposing multiple punishments for the same offense. United 
States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980); McKeeth, 136 Idaho at 622. 
Mr. Suttle's case involves multiple charges resulting in multiple punishments for the 
same offense and therefore falls into the third category of double jeopardy violations. 
Protections against double jeopardy "[are] not such a fragile guarantee that 
prosecutors can avoid [their] limitations by the simple expedient of dividing a single 
crime into a series of temporal or spatial units." Brown, 432 U.S. at 169. Both the 
United States and Idaho Constitutions protect against prosecutions for multiple charges 
arising from such a single event. See Roberts, 320 U.S. at 267; McKeeth, 136 Idaho at 
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624. When a person commits multiple acts against the same victim during a single 
criminal episode and each act could independently support a conviction for the same 
offense, for double jeopardy purposes, the "offense" is typically the episode, not each 
individual act. Moffat, 154 Idaho at 532-33 (holding that domestic battery and attempted 
strangulation were the same offense under the Blockburger test for double jeopardy). 
Although the Moffat Court analyzing domestic battery and attempted 
strangulation, whereas here, Mr. Suttle was convicted of simple battery and attempted 
strangulation, the result is unchanged.3 As the Court noted in Moffat: 
We have already acknowledged that the attempted strangulation statute 
contains an element that the misdemeanor domestic battery statute does 
not-that the defendant chokes or attempts to strangle. Even if the 
alternative victim-one in a dating relationship with the defendant-could 
be considered an element required by the attempted strangulation statute, 
that only demonstrates that the attempted strangulation statute requires 
proof of another element that the misdemeanor domestic battery statute 
does not 
Moffat, 154 Idaho at 532, n.1. Similarly, while misdemeanor domestic battery requires 
the victim to be a "household member" or in a dating relationship with the perpetrator, 
where simple battery does not, such does not change the analysis for purposes of 
Bfockburger. The relationship between the two persons is simply another element 
required by the attempted strangulation statute, which only shows that the attempted 
strangulation statute requires proof of yet another element that the misdemeanor battery 
statute does not. During the altercation in this case, Mr. Suttle allegedly struck 
Ms. Ahmuty about the face and in the head, burned Ms. Ahmuty's arm with a cigarette, 
and placed his hands around her neck. (PSI, pp.2, 95.) Further, as discussed, supra, 
both the attempted strangulation and the punching to the face and back of the head 
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occurred while the parties were on the couch, in the same course of conduct. (PSI, 
pp.2, 95.) 
In this case, where the State charged both a misdemeanor battery and an 
attempted strangulation for the altercation that occurred on March 10, 2009, the 
conviction on the duplicate charge should be vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Suttle respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for attempted 
strangulation because the duplicate convictions and punishments violate his 
constitutional rights to be free from double jeopardy. 
DATED this 30th day of January, 2015 . 
. i ! / II 
. J I ~/ I 
SALL v J. 6ooi_)y 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
3 The domestic battery statute, I.C. § 18-923, incorporates the misdemeanor battery 
elements, I.C. § 18-903, although when analyzed by the Moffat Court, the Court 
declined to consider subpart (c). 
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